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The Structure of Legal System 
(The Concept of Multi-Layered Legal System) 
 
 
Abstract. In the study the legal system is conteptualized as a meaning system which 
contains the text layer, the layer of the legal dogmatics, the layer of judicial precedents 
and in some modern legal system the layer of the constitutional tights is added to these. 
The study outlines the connections among these layers of law comparing the continental 
legal systems rooted in the Roman law to the common law systems. With this concept of 
law the study analyses the history of legal theory and makes a typology of the tightening 
concepts of law which emphasize only one layer of the law. For example, for the French 
ecole de l’exégèse in the 19. century the law was only the text, for the German Bergiffs-
jurisprudenz the law was the layer of the legal doctrines, or for the legal realists the law 
was the judge made law; and newly for Ronald Dworkin and his followers the law is 
identified as the layer of the constitutional rights first of all. 
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If one decides to make a comparative analysis of the various modern legal 
systems, one will inevitably encounter the following phenomenon; namely, 
that the very same component which one finds in the legal systems of different 
countries is of varying importance; in certain countries it plays a major 
role, while in others it is much less important. Such a comparative study 
which examines components of several different countries will reach a far 
more comprehensive result than research which only focuses on a single 
legal system. Therefore, an attempt to create an overall legal concept will 
be more precise if it is based on a comparative study of the various legal 
systems of the present, and further compared with the opposing influential 
legal theories of the last centuries. The result of such a comparison will 
show that these legal theories restrict the actually existing multi-layered 
legal systems. This can be easily integrated into an overall theory of law, 
which is the aim of this brief study. 
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1. Restricting legal theories and multi-layered legal concepts 
 
If one examines the development of the legal theories of the past two-hundred 
years, one observes the formulation of certain opposing legal concepts which 
identified law with phenomena that determined the rulings of court. 
Montesquieu’s surprising statement, which declared that the judge is the 
mere mouthpiece of law, appeared in numerous tendencies of legal theory 
in the last two-hundred years. First, it was the French “école de l’exégèse” in 
the first half of the 19th century; later on it appeared in German legal 
theories by Julius Bergbohm and, some time later, by Hans Kelsen. Sub-
sequently it made its appearance in the theories of the Soviets.  
 The legal concept which identified law with the text of the past decisions 
made by state bodies was opposed by the leading German legal concept of 
the 19th century, namely the pandectist jurisprudence, known under 
several designations, such as “Begriffsjurisprudenz” or “jurisdiction built 
on legal-doctrines”, according to the terminology of its critics. This concept 
defined law as a “touched up”, refined system of legal-terms. Its main 
representatives, Georg Puchta and Bernhard Windscheid, for instance, saw 
the determination of the judicial decisions through the hierarchical order 
of the legal terms, and when the first draft of the German BGB (civil code) 
was completed with the participation of Windschied in 1884, the practicing 
judges of the time labeled it a “monstrosity of jurists.1 It is impossible to 
deal with everyday cases, with all their tiny divergences, if legislation is 
based upon an abstract system of legal terms—this was the opinion of the 
practicing judges. 
 This clarity of legal notions and the identification of law with the clear-
cut system of legal terms appeared in the United States in the 1870’s, almost 
contemporaneously with Windscheid’s works, through the participation of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the dean of the Faculty of Law of Harvard 
University.2 It remained the leading tendency of the American legal practice 
and influenced works on legal science for the next several decades. An 
opposing tendency emerged which defined law as the collection of all 
judicial decisions. In Germany, it was supported by the members of the so-
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called School of Free Law, while in the United States its representatives 
were the exponents of the trend of “legal realism”. 
 From time to time, although a few influential jurists appeared who endeav-
ored to include the multiple layers of law in their legal concepts, although the 
authority of the ruling tendency always oppressed these random attempts. 
The authors of multi-layer legal concepts therefore abandoned their ideas, 
and they too adopted the mainstream direction. The German Carl Friedrich 
von Savigny can be mentioned, for instance, who, in his earlier works wrote 
about legal institutions and legal dogmatics which analyze them and formulate 
general rules. Later on, however, influenced by Georg Puchta himself, he 
also shifted his attention towards a legal concept built on legal terms in spite 
of being one of the main supporters of the idea of a school of legal history. 
Another example is Francois Gény who, at the end of the 19th century in 
France, opposed textual positivism propagated by the “école de l’exégèse”, 
and emphasized the importance of the multiple components of law. In 
1921 in the United States, Benjamin Cardozo emphasized the role of the 
multi-layered legal components in his book “The Nature of the Juridical 
Process”.3 Later on, however, he adopted the views of the legal realists, 
who emphasized the central role of the rulings of the court. 
 Thus, these theories define law as a “textual layer”, “legal dogmatic layer”, 
and “a layer of judge-made law”, though it must be said that these theories 
only recognized one of the three layers as law at a time, and sometimes the 
coming into existence of one of these theories was in reaction to another.  
 Another layer of the law was emphasized by an emerging legal theory 
in the United States in the 1960’s, which can be identified with the name of 
Ronald Dworkin.4 This theory found the essence of law in the fundamental 
constitutional rights and basic constitutional principles. Dworkin’s thesis was 
set out in his book “Taking Rights Seriously”, though his legal theories are 
more clearly expressed if we paraphrase the title as “only basic rights should 
be taken seriously!”. In the United States from the 1960’s the extension of the 
judicial process based directly on the constitution led to the relegation of 
simple laws to the background while, in parallel, the doctrinal conceptual 
system of certain legal branches also lost its importance. These developments, 
which began in the United States, have emerged in several other countries 
in the past years, while in the U.S. they fell into the background.5 The 
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textual layer, the doctrinal layer, the layer of judge-made law and, above 
all, the layer of fundamental constitutional rights—these notions summarize 
the most influential legal theories of the last two-hundred years. How is 
one to create an overall theory, a multi-layered legal concept out of these 
opposing legal concepts? 
 
 
2. The layers of the law 
 
If one examines the development of the modern legal systems, a striking 
feature of its progressive tendency is that the rules of law tended to take 
the form of decisions of the sovereign power, and that judicial decisions had 
to be made according to the texts of the state power. Based on the medieval 
continental European jurisdictions, which already possessed collections of 
customary laws, the legal practice that can be always amended by the 
central state power was rapidly accomplished with the influence of the 
absolutist rulers of the 1600’s.6 Later on, with the sovereign power’s growing 
democratisation and the development of parliamentarism, it was only the 
place of making the final decisions that shifted from the royal authority to 
the parliaments. With this progress, law became the collection of the 
decisions of the sovereign power, but it primarily became a collection of 
legislated texts in countries with a democratic political system. In England 
and in countries influenced by England’s common law system, however, it 
was attenuated by allowing the high courts to create judge-made law.  
 With the adoption of a multi-party system and within the sphere of mass-
media based on freedom of speech, the parliament became the culminating 
point of the society’s political common will; so the law that appeared in 
legislative texts more or less depended on the will and majority opinions 
of society. The court decisions that depend on legislation fulfill society’s 
self-governing nature: society itself decides when the judges apply these 
fixed laws in each individual case and dispute. Because law fundamentally 
appears in legislative texts and is a result of a democratic decision of the 
state power, it tends to express the empirical common will of society.  
 When textual positivism identifies law with legislative texts, it emphasizes 
an important aspect, but it also commits two fundamental mistakes. One of 
these concerns the following: in the complex and intricate social context, 
thousands and thousands of legal regulations have to be perpetually created 

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if they are to be consistent. If this is not done properly, they may end up 
canceling each other’s effects through contradictory content. It might be well 
imagined what sort of legal chaos would result on the level of judicial case-
law. It is only a carefully prearranged system of legal concepts that can provide 
harmony amongst the many thousands of legal regulations. Furthermore, it 
is the unified application of these concepts in many legal rules that can 
maintain this intellectual systemic quality and consistency in a heightened 
form. Thus without a legal dogmatic layer, the layer of legal texts cannot 
function. Overlooking this fact is one of the errors of textual positivism.  
 The other source of error is the failure to take into account the openness of 
the legal regulations. It is very typical of code-like laws to use overall, rather 
general notions and regulations, which renders divergence possible in its 
application. This could result in several different judicial decisions in a 
country in similar or even identical cases, which would easily create legal 
chaos. Thus without a Supreme Courts’ use of concretizing precedents, the 
imprecise legal regulations could not properly function.7 
 Textual positivism, a concept of law built on legal dogmatics and the 
concept of judge-made law can be integrated into a multi-layer legal concept, 
if their striving for absoluteness is set aside. The textual layer of law, that 
can function as a consistent intellectual organization due to its prearranged 
doctrinal conceptual system, is connected to a democratic political common 
will, and among the existence of many thousands of legal provisions, it keeps 
the functioning of law in consistent order. The openness of the regulations 
that the texts of laws, that are formed from a legal-dogmatic point of view, 
contain, are counterbalanced by the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts. It 
is a jurisdiction built on precedent, and together with the doctrinally 
formed texts of laws, it renders a unified law for each country.  
 The importance and function of the aforementioned three layers of law 
can be easily observed in continental European legal systems, as well as 
those built on the common-law system, though in different proportions. It 
can be stated, that the more abstract the codified law gets in a legal system, 
the more inevitable it becomes to concretize the doctrinal categories, and 
to shape the judicial processes accordingly. Furthermore, the loose regulations 
that the codes contain have to be concretized and updated with the current 
judicial precedents. In contrast, the more specific and concrete the legislative 
provisions, the less necessary it becomes to have a doctrinal layer or a 
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concretizing body of judicial precedents. Accordingly, judicial precedent 
would instead function as a method of independent regulation, and not as 
a concretizing legal layer. The English legal system can be characterized 
as such a system, while the legislation of the United States started to shift 
in the last century towards that of the continental European countries’ 
codified legal system and, compared to the English system, a stronger legal-
dogmatic categorical system was established in certain fields of law.8 
However, among the continental European countries’ legal systems, a visible 
difference can be observed concerning the importance of each of the three 
legal-layers; while in the German legal system and in the other continental 
legal systems influenced by it, the doctrinal layer is of high importance, it 
is much less so in the French legal system. 
 There is a divergence amongst the continental legal systems with regard 
to the development of the layer of judicial precedent. Although its signi-
ficance seems to be increasing everywhere in the course of the last few 
decades, it is mostly in the Scandinavian countries and Germany where it is of 
marked importance, while in the southern-European countries and France it is 
still not so highly emphasized.9 Among the post-socialist countries, it is in 
Hungary and Poland that a visible development can be observed concerning 
the importance of the aforementioned layer of judicial precedents.10 Besides 
the mere textual layer of official regulations, the layers of doctrine and 
judicial precedent are also an essential part of the legal systems of these 
countries. In Hungary, the empirical statistics which analyze the rulings of 
the courts prove that the position taken by the Courts is based on the texts 
of law, as well as on the interpretations of certain doctrinal notions, together 
with the precedents of the Supreme Court which provide solutions for 
some of the legal dilemmas which were left unsolved by the former legal 
regulations.11 The cooperation of these three layers of law is not recent; it can 
be observed in the legal history of the past centuries and, in some countries 
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where a Constitutional Court was established, it was even accompanied by 
a layer of constitutional rights. If we do not accept Ronald Dworkin’s 
overemphasizing attitude on this field, and we attempt to integrate funda-
mental rights into an extensive legal concept, as a recently established 
legal layer, the following connections have to be emphasized. 
 As a starting point it has to be stressed that this recent legal layer may 
have a different impact on the three already existing layers within the 
legal systems of various countries. Wherever the new legal layer comes 
into being with the establishment of a Constitutional Court, it inevitably 
influences the creation of the textual layer. A judicial decision which is 
declared unconstitutional loses its validity—this is the sole influence of 
the layer of fundamental rights. Its other important influence is due to the 
procedure of considering the essential normative basis of the previous 
constitutional decisions before issuing new judicial decisions.  
 A third influence can be observed if the fundamental constitutional 
rights and their concretizing constitutional restrictions are included in 
each legal branch’s doctrinal activity, and the doctrinal system of legal terms 
of the criminal law, family law, labour law, etc. is (also) altered according 
to the legal layer of fundamental rights. If this is accomplished, the new 
legal layer, besides its effect on the textual layer, will have an influence 
on the doctrinal layer as well. 
 Finally, a third influence is that of fundamental rights on certain court 
rulings; either through its inclusion in the analysis of judicial decisions—
together with other evaluations, or through their exclusion—or relegating 
the relevant judicial decision itself to the background, and issuing a ruling 
based on fundamental constitutional rights. If the latter occurs—as it did 
in the United States during the period of the activist Warren Court in the 
1960’s and 1970’s, then fundamental rights push all other legal layers into 
the background. In most legal systems which have constitutional courts, 
the layer of fundamental rights only influences the layer of the legal text, 
and jurists also form their “de lege ferenda” suggestions that consider 
fundamental rights according to the legislation and not with the aim of 
influencing the judicial decisions. 
 In this restricted solution the traditional cooperation of the three legal 
layers remains, and the fundamental constitutional rights only slightly modify 
its final outcome. Aspects of righteousness, and influences that have a short-
term pacifying effect on the empirical common will, improve the functioning 
of the legal system.  
 If the aforementioned ideal arrangement is established, the layer of 
legal texts, together with the layer of legal dogmatics and that of judicial 
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precedents and fundamental constitutional rights together provide a unified 
legal system. This is the goal of the concept of a multi-layered legal system. 
Besides defining the ideal concept of law, it also points out the shortcomings 
of other legal concepts that strive for the absoluteness of one of the legal layers.  
 
 
3. The implications of the concept of the multi-layered legal system 
 
The broadening of the concept of law and the recognition of other legal 
layers engenders the necessity of reconsidering several legal phenomena. 
In the following, we shall examine a few of these. 
 (The definition of law)
 One of the first aims of the necessary recon-
sideration has to be to redefine what law itself means. In other words, if we 
include the doctrinal system as an inevitable part of the law then, accordingly, 
it has to be expressed within the definition of law itself.  
 There is another aspect in which law differs from non-legal norms. Namely, 
it produces an intellectual system, and after a certain stage of develop-
ment this emphasizes the notions and categories that are used by legal 
norms from other notions of everyday-thinking. The only way to eliminate 
the (possible) inconsistencies that might occur among the many thousands 
of legal norms is to deliberately create specific legal terms, expressions 
and classifications, and then systematically use these when dealing with 
any legal norm in question. Contrary to this, other non-legal, social norms 
rely on notions that are used in everyday-life, and the solutions based on 
these notions do not constitute a unified intellectual system.  
 Taking all this into consideration, the definition of law can be given as the 
following: law is a system of norms and their terms that express regulations 
and prohibitions which, failing all else, is sustained by coercion of the state.  
 
(Legal dogmatics as a barrier of legislation)
 The prearranged system 
of legal terms that the legal norms are based on also has an influence on 
the modifiable nature of certain legal norms. Namely, the modified norm 
has to fit the already existing unified intellectual system and, for instance, 
a new legal norm can not use a classification that would clash with the 
classifications used by the already existing legal norms. For example, in the 
criminal law of most of the modern legal systems, the intentional character is 
separated from negligence when judging culpability—or rather these 
concepts are divided into different degrees. If a new legal rule contained a 
new classification of guilt, regardless of the already existing ones, the 
numerous restrictions of the criminal code would simply collapse. To replace 
a legal norm with a new one is only possible if it is doctrinally verified. 
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The emphasis of this connection sheds a different light on the ability to 
modify legislation and the role of legal dogmatics which ensures the law’s 
intellectual unity.  
 Often it is sufficient to include well-trained lawyers in the parliamentary 
apparatus and legislative committees in the ministries in order to verify 
the consequences of certain amendments. But if a more significant amendment 
or a new enactment of the legislature is at stake, the consideration of the 
doctrinal questions should be done by a specialized legal experts in the 
relevant field. This is especially so in the case of codified laws. 
 Inasmuch as the politicians in parliaments often amend and interfere 
with laws which rely on a prearranged notional system, or rather establish 
new codes, and this does not affect the fundamentals of the legal-dogmatics, 
we have to hypothetically assume that there has to be a transformational-
mediator sphere in existence between the legislation and the legal dogmatic 
sphere, that somehow connects legislators following a political logic and the 
legal dogmatic sphere itself. In order to verify this hypothesis, the following 
things have to be taken into consideration: the methods of codification, the 
political intentions of the parties, or rather the professional organizations of 
legislation. As a result, the outlines of a legal-political sphere can be 
detected which, in some form or another, is present in every modern 
democracy, particularly in the case of the continental European countries.  
 On the one hand, this legal-political sphere exists as a part of the legal 
subsystem that is directed towards politics, and on the other hand, some 
institutions can be found as part of the political subsystem that are involved 
with issues of legislation. Ideally, these two elements of the legal-political 
organization adopt parts of the “de lege ferenda”-type restrictions in a 
two-step transformational process, and in the course of a selected borrowing 
the political side gradually tables bills which were originally formed as 
part of a doctrinal activity, according to the logic of politics (for instance 
the method of aspiring to maximize the number of votes).  
 The part of legal-politics that is established as a part of the legal subsystem, 
typically consists of bodies and assemblies of the various legal professions. 
The conferences, programs, membership-meetings and publications of these 
bodies mostly emphasize proposals about amendments that react to the 
recent social problems, and that were previously outlined and supervised 
from a doctrinal point of view and already published in some of the legal 
periodicals. Thus, a part of the numerous “de lege ferenda”-type propositions 
that the legal experts of universities and the members of the high courts 
etc. outlined only from a juridical point of view, become the object of a 
certain filtering process. As a result, those propositions will come to the 
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foreground that are the reactions on the current social problems. At the 
same time, non-topical propositions that concern academic-scientific 
issues only excite attention in scientific circles and are the subject-matter 
of the legal periodicals, without having any influence on the functioning 
legal sphere. 
 The other part of the legal-political sphere that is founded as part of 
politics, consists of the legal experts of the parties, the legal groups of the 
parliamentary party-factions, and of the groups of the jurists who are the 
members of the so-called “background-institutions” of the political parties, 
such as the political foundations and party-schools. Though the aspirations of 
the parties are mostly determined by the maximization of the votes (and due 
to this they try to include motions in the party’s program that are likely to 
enhance the number of votes), the adequacy of the programs inquires 
aspirations that are more or less workable. On account of the latter reason, 
the legal experts of the parties can only choose from propositions concerning 
amendments that are adaptable from a legal-dogmatic point of view. Although 
it becomes very important method to start looking for such motions among 
the lot that would fit the interest of a certain party the best, or rather to look 
out for those that would be against their interest the most. The jurists of the 
parties mostly concentrate on those “de lege ferenda”-type regulative propositions 
that were already emphasized on the assemblies and conferences of the 
associations of the lawyers, and the social consequences of which were already 
stressed in relation to certain propositions. Thus with a double transformation—
despite the pushing of the pure legal-dogmatic point of view into the 
background and emphasizing the logic of politics—those regulatory models 
will appear in legislation, that do not violate the intellectual coherence of 
law. The legal experts of parliamentary committees are continually on the watch 
for motions concerning amendments that would violate the established legal-
dogmatic system.  
 It is only this legal-politic sphere that mediates between law and politics, 
that can assure the proper operation of legislation, and the intellectual 
systematic character of law.  
 
(The expansion of the circle of legal sources)
 The inclusion of more legal 
layers into the concept of law requires the expansion of the circle of legal 
sources. As the multi-layer legal concept can be best observed in the legal 
systems of the continental European countries, let us look at their legal sources. 
 It is the state bodies that are in charge of the textual layer of law, and the 
sources of the textual layer are those forms of decision making, that contain 
the textual layer of law. The most characteristic of these are the forms of 
decision making in the case of parliamentary acts, the forms of decision 
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making of the governmental orders, the orders of the ministers, or rather 
the locally prevailing forms of decision making of the local authorities.  
 The first outcome of these forms of decision making is a series of open 
legal norms, that can only be accurately interpreted according to the legal-
dogmatic categories that the norms contain. The reduction of the occurring 
disparate possibilities and the establishing of a more unified interpretation 
can be achieved with the consensus of the legal profession. The employ-
ment of the accepted legal opinion in legal case-decisions, and—due to 
juridic decisions that refer to these—also the legal-dogmatic works that 
express legal consensus, all contain characteristics of legal source. This is 
typical of Germany, for instance, where in the case of legal dilemmas that 
have to be decided by the Supreme Court, the judges often refer to works 
of certain jurists.12 It is characteristic of numerous countries that when a 
decision has to be made about a legal dilemma, it is the commentaries of 
the law that they refer to, and not directly to the law as it applies to the 
case. According to this—although on a comparatively small scale—, some 
systematizing legal-dogmatic works may also serve as a kind of a legal 
source in certain legal systems.  
 The legal textual layer’s regulations—even if it is amplified with the 
legal-dogmatic interpretations—still remain open, and the layer of the 
concretizing judicial precedents that supplements it and creates a further 
legal source, has to be perpetually observed by lawyers, if they want to 
know what they should expect in their cases. These judge-made laws, that 
gained considerable importance in the legal systems of the continental 
European countries, were mostly created by the Supreme Courts of the 
countries in question, and the forms of decision making of these judicial 
forums function as a legal source. 
 Finally, wherever a constitutional court is in existence, its concretizing 
decisions concerning fundamental constitutional rights and basic principles 
also serve as a legal source. These constitutional decisions have to be 
separated from the concretizing precedents that concern basic legal decisions, 
because the fundamental rights that these are based on are not systematized 
dogmatically, they are usually more abstract and compared to certain legal 
restrictions their openness is greater, or the fundamental rights contradict 
each other in some cases, respectively. This is one of the various reasons 
why, based on these, in the continental countries it is the constitutional 
court that decides in these cases, and their influence is reduced to 
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legislation, furthermore, they do not directly affect the judicial decisions. 
Naturally, there are great differences between the degree of influence that 
they have on a countries’ legislation , and apart from most of the countries 
where the impact of fundamental rights and the decisions of the constitutional 
court (that serve as the interpretations of them) is restricted to the role of 
controlling legislation, in Germany they also influence certain judicial 
decisions. In theory the judge, based upon the constitutional court decisions 
and the constitutional basic rights, could simply set aside the given judicial 
provisions that should be applied under those circumstances and directly 
refer to these in a constitutional case, as it was achieved in “the rights 
revolution” in the United States in the 1960’s.13 (However, this did not 
become customary in Europe. In other respects, if this is not established, 
then it can result in the falling of the other legal layers to the background, 
and furthermore, in the course of the re-politicization of the law it can 
lead to the corrosion of the predictable judicial decisions—as it could be 
seen as one of the consequences of the “ rights revolution” in the United 
States.14 The existence of these degrees show that the constitutional court-
decisions would only be of full value as a legal source if they had direct 
influence on certain judicial decisions, though this only appears as an 
exception in the continental legal systems. In most places their impact is 
narrowed down to the control of legislation, therefore their function as a 
kind of a legal source is limited. 
 
(Broadening the methods of statutory interpretation)
 Having included 
numerous other legal layers into the theory of law and the legal system, 
and the discovery of the determined relations between them, influences 
the ways of legal interpretation as well. Let us look at a few connections 
visible on this field. 
 The recognition of the importance of the textual layer of law brings 
forth the recognition of the primary importance of grammatical interpretation. 
It is the parliament, as the chosen representative of society’s political 
common will, that is in charge of the proper interpretation and usage of 
the textual layer of jurisdiction, therefore to take the grammatical meaning 
of the text seriously is identical with taking the empirical common will 
seriously. The several ways of interpretations that rely on the other legal 
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layers can only advance as far as it does not contradict the clear grammatical 
meaning of the legal text.  
 The legal-dogmatic layer and the emphasis on the intellectually systematic 
character of law in the course of the functioning of legislation impels the 
employment of those ways of legal interpretation, that, beyond the grammatical 
meaning of the textual layer, help the judge in decision making in a given 
case. One of the possibilities is the interpretation based on the use of legal-
logical maxims, that, starting from the text’s perceivable meaning, but not 
encroaching it or using judicial autocracy, manages to control the judicial 
procedure. The so-called “argumentum a minore ad maius” (to reach more 
from the less by inference), and the “argumentum a maiore ad minus” (to 
reach the less from more), their collective designation is “argumentum a 
fortiori”, or the “argumentum a contrario” (induction from opposites) etc. can 
control jurisdiction with the extrapolation of the text’s perceivable meaning. 
In order to remedy a situation when a legal gap occurs, the judicial decision 
that relies upon analogies shall also end up leaning on the legal-dogmatic 
layer, as it constructs the verdict directly from the legal principles (this 
process is called legal analogy), or it transfers a legal provision that was 
created in a similar case, so to base the current regulation on the former 
example (the method of statutory analogy). As to the doctrinal interpretation, 
it implements the embedding of the notions found in the textual layer, 
therefore it binds the textual and the legal-dogmatic layer together, in relation 
to the current case. 
 The interpretation based upon precedents connects the textual legal layer 
with the layer of judicial precedents, and it specifies the open regulations, 
and therefore assures the nationwide unity of jurisdiction. Thus, this is of 
primary importance in the concept of the multi-layer legal system. 
 From the multi-layer legal system’s point of view it can be qualified as 
dangerous, when in relation to a current case, the verdict relies on an 
interpretation that is based on such constitutional court decisions that 
concretize fundamental constitutional rights and basic principles. The 
American legal practice that carried this into effect is a proper example to 
show how this process “re-politicizes” law, and how it instigates to push 
the other legal layers—besides the layer of the fundamental rights—into 
the background.15 The German legal practice is also liable to experience 
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such a shift, and the only reason why it has not yet shown such negative 
sings is because—despite having accepted the fundamental rights as directly 
prevailing through the German constitution—in practice they are rarely 
included into the current judicial procedures.  
 In Central Europe it was in Poland where, for only a few years, the 
Constitutional Court’s legal interpretations were obligatory, that is, the 
judges were bound to take it into account. But the judicial opposition to 
the functioning of a re-politicized Constitutional Court led to its exclusion 
from the new constitution of 1997.16 The Hungarian constitutional court—
even on an international scale—has a very great competence, and it has a right 
to eliminate laws, though the Constitutional Court decisions do not directly 
influence judicial decisions. In fact there are some lawyers and smaller groups 
of legal experts who—based on the American pattern achieved by “the rights 
revolution”—support the introduction of the Constitutional Court’s direct 
influence on judicial decisions, but this has not been put into practice yet.  
 Thus in order to conclude, the concept of the multi-layered legal system 
supports the idea of a law on a larger scale, accepting the parallel operation 
of several methods of legal interpretation at the same time, therefore it is 
against legal concepts that place a single legal layer into the center.  
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